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Recent Trends and Prospects for Brazilian Antitrust 
 
Gesner Oliveira   2
 
  Antitrust policy has become increasingly important with the liberalization of the 
Brazilian economy over the 1990s.  The role of the Administrative Council for Economic 
Defense (CADE) has come into center stage in the process. 
 
  As Table 1 demonstrates, the number of monthly cases judged increased 2259% 
with respect to the to the first three decades of CADE and has increased 875% with 
respect to the first two years after the enactment of the current antitrust law.  71% of the 
decisions of the 37-year CADE's history was taken in the period 1996-99. 
 
Table 1 – Number and Average of Monthly Cases Judged 
       
              SOURCE: CADE. 
 
The goal of this text is to review the main roles of CADE, describe the recent trends and 
discuss  the prospects for the future.  These points are developed in the next three 
sections, respectively. 
 
1.  The Development of Brazil's Antitrust Legislation and the Three Roles of CADE 
 
  The globalization of the economy induced the rapid dissemination of competition 
legislation around the world.  Over eighty countries report having antitrust legislation 
today, in contrast with the less than forty countries until the 1980s.  
 
  Canada and Australia passed antitrust legislation contemporaneously to the 
Sherman Act, but their implementation only gained importance during the 1980s.  In 
Europe, national antitrust legislation was elaborated in the post-war years and the 
European Community normatives concerning antitrust policy were already included in 
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In the process of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, various developing 
countries, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, have enacted antitrust 
legislation. 
 
1.1 The Development of Antitrust Legislation in Brazil 
 
  In Brazil, although the first antitrust normatives are from the 1930s and the main 
agency  - Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE  - was created in 1962, 
antitrust policy only gained relevance in the 1990s. 
 
  From the Constitution of 1937 until that of 1988, the prevailing tendency was to 
focus on "protection of the popular economy", typical of economies in which the 
government intervenes directly in  the market. The Commission of Supply and Prices 
(SUNAB) was created in 1962 and the Inter-ministerial Price Council (CIP) was formed 
in 1968.  These institutions promoted price fixing and coordination, generating distortions 
in the market. 
 
  In the late 1980s, the opening of the economy to international trade, deregulation 
and privatization brought Brazil closer to a true market economy, in which firm behavior 
is dependent on market forces and shaped by the rule of law.   At the same time, the end 
of hyperinflation brought about by the 1994 "Real" Plan reestablished the notion of 
relative prices, re-focusing the public and private agents' to microeconomic factors. 
 
  A few weeks before the launching of the new currency, Law 8884 of June of 1994 
was enacted reinforcing CADE's powers and transforming it into an independent agency, 
providing its President, six Commissioners and Attorney-General fixed mandates.  In 
addition, the new legislation introduced merger control, enabled CADE to impose more 
austere penalties to antitrust illicit behavior, entrusted the Economic Law Office of the 
Ministry of Justice (SDE) the power to open investigation and  entrusted the Office of 
Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance (SEAE) the role of providing expert 
economic advice.  All firms, including the public ones, are subject to Law 8884. 
 
  CIP and SUNAB were extinguished in 1991 and 1997, respectively.  Industries 
providing basic infrastructure previously controlled by the government and subject to 
natural monopolies were privatized and subjected to regulation by agencies with more 
autonomy with respect to the central administration, such as the National 
Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL), the National Electric Energy Agency 
(ANEEL) and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP). 
 
1.2  The Three Roles of CADE 
 
The Repressive Role 
   4
  CADE has three main roles:  repressive, preventive and educational. The first one 
is to repress "infractions to the economic order" such as defined in articles 20 and 21 of 
Law 8884.  Suppose, for example, that two or more firms in a particular relevant market 
establish a price agreement to function as a cartel.  This constitutes an infraction 
according to articles 20 and 21, part II.  An accusation may be made by any person or by 
the government itself. 
 
  If enough evidence of a possible infraction is presented to SDE, this secretary  
will promote an administrative process.  In case more evidence be needed a 
preliminary inquiry will be will be made.  Once the investigation is completed the 
process will be submitted to CADE for final ruling.  If the Council considers the 
accusation correct, the penalties of Law 8884 apply.  They are relatively less severe than 
those applied in the US, reaching 30% of the company's turnover or 15% in the case of a 
manager, directly or indirectly responsible for the infraction.  Both penalties may be 
doubled in case of recidivation. 
 
If a violation occurs in a regulated industry such as telecommunications, the investigation 
will be conducted by the sectoral agency, ANATEL.  If the company involved infringes 
Law 8884, ANATEL will submit the process to CADE to impose the penalties. 
  
  Trade associations or professional associations may sometimes promote uniform 
commercial practices among its members.  If such conduct is deemed illicit, the parties 
responsible for such practices will be subject to fines which may vary between US$ 3,500 
and US$ 3,500,000. 
 
  Several other anticompetitive practices such as price discrimination and tying may 
in certain circumstances be deemed an infraction. Predatory pricing, defined as the 
artificial reduction of price below average variable cost with the intention of eliminating 
competitors and dominating the market, may also be an infringement.  Since 1994, 
CADE has decided over 800 cases of anticompetitive conducts of various types. 
 
  The analysis of such practices requires a careful examination of the market effects 
of the different types of conducts.  It is necessary to consider the specific context of each 
conduct occurred and its economic reasonableness.  The costs and benefits must all be 
considered to determine the net effect on the market and on the consumer.  
  
The Preventive Role: Merger Control 
 
The second role of CADE is the prevention of infractions to the economic order through 
merger control.  This is done according to article 54 of Law 8884, by the examination of 
contracts and operations such as mergers, acquisitions, joint-ventures and corporate 
reorganizations in which at least one of the participants detains a dominant position in the 
market. 
    5
  Suppose, for example, that a foreign company with a revenue of R$ 400,000,000
2 
or holds 20% or more of the relevant market, acquires a national company or another 
foreign company operating in the country.  The transaction should be presented to CADE 
within fifteen working days after the acquisition.  CADE will approve or deny the 
transaction, taking into account among other factores, the technical studies provided by 
SEAE and SDE.  Since Law 8884 went into effect, more than 400 operations of this type 
have been examined. 
 
  As in the United States, Canada and European Union, the majority of transactions 
submitted to CADE are approved (around 95%), with only a minority (5%) not being 
approved or approved conditional to performance commitments.
3 
 
  As in other countries, when a company or individual does not agree with a 
CADE’s decision, it is always possible to appeal to the courts. 
 
The Educational Role  
 
  Last, but not least, CADE has an educational role. In addition to lectures, seminars 
and pamphlets on the legislation,  consultations to CADE are useful for this purpose.  
Any citizen, public entity or company may consult the Council on issues relating to 
antitrust matters. This permits a useful debate over important topics such as the impact of 
state subsidies on competition or the need for regulatory reform on civil aviation. 
Effective implementation of antitrust legislation depends crucially on a cultural change in 




2.  Recent Trends in CADE's Performance 
 
2.1 The Advances in CADE's Jurisprudence 
 
  One can identify recent advances in CADE's jurisprudence in the three  roles 




Conduct Control:  The Repressive Role 
 
  CADE has demonstrated in 1999 that it is determined to combat anticompetitive 
practices.  In this respect, one should highlight the condemnation of the price cartel in the 
                                                 
2 Four-hundred million reais is approximately 218.6 million dollars at the exchange rate of 7
th of January of 
2000. 
3  Article 58 of Law 8884 stipulates the terms for the determination of performance commitments through 
which a transaction which presents anticompetitive characteristics may brought under compliance with 
paragraph 1 of article 54 of the same law.   6
steel industry which led to fines in the order of R$ 60 million.
4  Previous decisions 
imposed sanctions on trade associations for the price setting schemes and uniform 
commercial practices.  
 
  In addition, CADE’s Resolution # 20 provided useful guidelines for dealing with 
anticompetitive practices.  For the first time in Brazil technical criteria were explicitly 
considered by the authority in the evaluation of anticompetitive practices.  This is an 
important task, given that some potentially illicit practices are not well known and are 
often mixed-up, such as in the case of predatory pricing and dumping. 
  These facts, together with the dissemination of the competitive culture led to a 
larger number of cases and an increase in the rate of condemnation of such practices in 
1999, as shown on Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Rate of Condemnation in Conduct Cases 
1998-1999 
 
    SOURCE: CADE. 
 
  It seems reasonable to suppose the existence of an expected interval in which, in 
principle, the condemnation rate should fall, indicated as being between 10% and 90% in 
Table 2.  Such parameters serve only as a reference, since only with concrete   
jurisprudence over the next decades will more clear patterns be identifiable. 
 
  On the one hand, if an insignificant fraction of cases results in condemnation, one 
could consider that cases were examined erroneously or that the community was not 
aware about the law, leading to a large number of charges not applicable in  terms of the 
legislation.  This seems to have been the situation in the first years of Law 8884, to a 
great extent due to interventionist actions of the government which brought generalized 
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charges without properly defining the illicits involved  and not respecting the due 
process. On the other hand, it would be naive to imagine that the rate of condemnation 
would reach 100%.  One could suspect, in such a case, of a pro-accusation bias. 
 
  Last, but not least, with CADE’s Resolution # 19 the average delay was reduced 
from 191 days in 1998 to 24 among other factores in 1999, in the case of appeals to the 
Plenary of CADE under the presence of cease orders. 
  
Merger Control:  the Preventive Role 
 
  In relation to CADE's preventive role, the Council developed a non-interventionist 
posture, in line with the world trend, as observed by the reduction in CADE's intervention 
in merger control, in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Intervention Rate in Merger Control 
 
 
                  SOURCE: CADE. 
 
 
  In the first two years of application of Law 8884, performance commitments were 
imposed in a large proportion of cases in which article 54 of Law 8884 was applied, 
resulting in a large rate of intervention over the period of 1994-96, shown in Table 3 
(50%). All approvals were conditioned to performance commitments during this period.  
A sharp contrast is observable starting in 1996 when the intervention rate fell, reaching 
2.7% in 1998-99, which is in line with the international experience. 
 
  These numbers suggest two points.  First, the control of article 54 does not exist to 
deter the merger wave.  In fact,  no agency in the world, no matter how active it has been, 
has been able to avoid major structural changes. The intention is only to block the small 
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  In fact, there continued to be an intense increase in mergers and acquisitions. At 
the end of the year more than 226 cases were examined, 7.6% above CADE’s forecast 
and 57% more than in 1998. 
 
  Second, since the majority of transactions does not warrant intervention, the initial 
examination of all cases should be very simple, in order to avoid imposing high 
transaction costs on the economy, hampering the competitive market which CADE   
intends to foster. 
 
  This shows the importance of the simplification of the analysis initiated by 
Resolution #5 of 1996 and improved by Resolution #15 of 1998.  This is reflected in the 
decrease in the number of documents and information requested, shown in Table 4 and 
resulted in a decrease in delays, according to Table 5. 
 
 
Table 4 – Reducing Bureaucracy 
 
 
















Resolution # 5 Resolution # 15 Consultations
Number itens of information requested  9
Table 5 – Reduction in Delays 
 
            SOURCE: CADE 
 
This trend of reducing the bureaucracy is well illustrated by CADE's decision to 
be more flexible with respect to the requirement of translations and particularly of official 
translation of foreign documents.
5  
 
  Last but not least, the jurisprudence of CADE introduced an innovation in July of 
1999 with the adoption of a precautionary measure in the case of the Antarctica and 
Brahma merger as well as in January of 2000 in the case of the acquisition of Sprint by 
MCI. 
 
  CADE has also become more rigorous with regard to late notification. Gradually, 
the definition of the moment of occurrence of the transaction according to article 54 of 
Law 8884 was more precisely defined.  In 1999, the late notification rate was 19%, 
compared with 7% in 1988.  
 
Promotion of Free Competition:  The Educational Role 
 
  As emphasized earlier, it is impossible to overstate the importance of the 
dissemination of competition culture in countries like Brazil.  
  Capacity building is a first target.  In 1999, CADE together with the Ministry of 
Education and the Education Commission of the House of Representatives recommended 
the introduction of antitrust studies in the undergraduate and graduate curricula of Law, 
Economics, Business, Engineering and other related majors. 
 
                                                 
5  See the legal opinion of the Attorney General of CADE, Amauri Seralvo and the vote of Commissioner 

















Direction of the Analysis  10
  In the same direction, seminars and workshops were held in several capitals of the 
country.  CADE's Internship Program enabled more than 200 students from 13 different 
cities to work at CADE. 
 
  Second, the passing of Resolution 18 in the end of 1998 sought to provide 
orientation through consultations. This permitted CADE to contribute to the debate of 
questions of national importance, such as the "fiscal war" among the states of the 
federation, as well as themes related with the day-to-day routine of consumers such as the 
issue stores hours on Sundays.
6  The average time of analysis of consultation was reduced 
from 447 days in the period 1994-98 to 60 days after the passing of Resolution 18. 
 
  Lastly, CADE innovated by decentralizing its activities.  Several events, including 
public hearings about major cases, were held in different cities of the country. 
2.2 Institutional Building 
 
  The advances in CADE’s jurisprudence were accompanied by a systematic effort 
to strengthen the agency.  Four recent changes should be pointed out. 
 
  First, in the beginning of the year Temporary Measure (Medida Provisória) #1793 
of 1998, later approved by Congress in Law 9781 of the 19th of January of 1999, cretaed 
a notificatin fee. These charges provided R$ 5 million in 1999, which was applied 
towards the modernization of CADE. Though insufficient to supply the needs of the 
agency, CADE's budget increased from R$ 2.9 million in 1998 to R$ 9.8 million in 1999. 
 
  Second, in line with the commitment made on occasion of CADE's 37th 
anniversary on September 10, CADE began its efforts of moving to  new facilities.  In 
addition to providing for more adequate facilities for the realization of its functions, such 
change symbolizes the independence of the competition authority.  
 
  Third, CADE received its third Hélio Beltrão Prize for the introduction of  new 
methods of administration. 
 
  Lastly, the strategy of establishing partnerships with a particular emphasis on 
regulatory agencies led to an increase in the number of partnerships from 30 to 57 in 
1999.  
  
3.  Future Prospects 
 
  The recent experience of CADE stands out among the antitrust jurisprudence of 
the developing countries.  However, certain structural difficulties associated to 
institutional under investment and the lack of competition culture persist. 
 
                                                 
6  See Consultation # 38/99 reported by Commissioner Marcelo Callari and Consultation # 41/99 reported 
by Commissioner Lucia Helena Salgado.   11
  The continued efforts aimed at strengthening competition will require further 
development in three areas: 
i)  overcome the institutional under investment with the creation of a 
permanent workforce at CADE, already determined by article 81 of Law 
8884, but not yet implemented; 
ii)  achieve greater interaction between CADE and the regulatory agencies; 
iii)  rationalize the division of work among the Brazilian competition bodies 
and reduce the bureaucracy associated with conduct and merger controls.  
 
A project to deal with the first goal (i) has already been suggested to the Executive 
branch.  The strategy of cooperation agreements with the regulatory agencies aims at 
achieving the second goal (ii).  CADE's performance since the passing of Law 8884 
justifies changing the Law itself, providing CADE with the necessary instruments to 
accomplish its role in a global economy. 